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Abstract 
 
The socially optimal allocation has been regarded to be unspecifiable because of utility’s 
interpersonal incomparability, Arrow’s general possibility theorem, and other factors. This paper 
examines this problem by focusing not on the social welfare function but instead on the utility 
possibility frontier in dynamic models with a heterogeneous population. A unique balanced 
growth path was found on which all of the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous 
households are equally and indefinitely satisfied (sustainable heterogeneity). With appropriate 
government interventions, such a path is always achievable and is uniquely socially optimal for 
almost all generally usable (i.e., preferences are complete, transitive, and continuous) social 
welfare functions. The only exceptions are some variants in Nietzsche type social welfare 
functions, but those types of welfare functions will rarely be adopted in democratic societies. 
This result indicates that it is no longer necessary to specify the shape of the social welfare 
function to determine the socially optimal growth path in a heterogeneous population. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Problems of economic inequality, wealth disparity, and justice have long been central issues in 
economics and are again a hot topic in the midst of the great recession that began in 2008. The 
concerns of the Occupy Wall Street movement are a recent example. However, the criteria for 
socially optimal allocation have not been universally agreed upon because of utility’s 
interpersonal incomparability, Arrow’s general possibility theorem (Arrow, 1951), and other 
factors. Although the problem of utility’s interpersonal incomparability was solved by Bergson 
(1938) and Samuelson (1947), their idea was fundamentally criticized by Arrow (1951). 
Arrow’s criticism can be worked around if the assumptions in Arrow (1951) are modified, for 
example, the assumption that every individual has a single-peaked preference is added (see e.g., 
Black, 1958); thus, social welfare functions can be used for various analyses. Nevertheless, even 
if social welfare functions can be used, there is no consensus on their shape. Because of this 
limitation, it has been difficult to provide useful information for arguments of social optimality. 
Even though many people have protested that current levels of economic inequality and wealth 
disparity are too large, there is no theoretical basis on which to judge their arguments.  
 To shed light on the arguments, I take a different approach in this paper. I focus not on 
the nature of the social welfare function but instead on the nature of the utility possibility 
frontier, because if the shape of the utility possibility frontier has some special characteristics, 
particularly if it is very constrained by some factors, it may be able to narrow the opportunities 
for a socially optimal allocation, regardless of any differences in the social welfare functions.  
 In particular, this paper examines social optimality in dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population and the condition for the state where all of the optimality conditions 
of all heterogeneous households are satisfied in these models. Intuitively, knowing whether the 
state where all of the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied is 
achieved seems to provide useful information for social optimality, but it is meaningless if we 
use static models because any competitive equilibrium naturally and always achieves this state 
even if the population is heterogeneous. It is also meaningless when dynamic models are used if 
the models use homogeneous populations, because such a state is naturally and always achieved 
and a homogeneous population generates no income inequality or wealth differential. Thus, the 
only remaining type of model to study is a dynamic model with a heterogeneous population. 
However, Becker (1980) showed that, in such models, the magnitudes of income inequality and 
wealth disparity eventually reach the limit; that is, the most patient household eventually will 
own all capital. All of the other households cannot satisfy their optimality conditions and will 
go bankrupt and, as it were, perish when even a very small negative shock occurs unless the 
authority intervenes. Consequently, examining social optimality in a heterogeneous population 
by using dynamic models has been regarded to be a meaningless task. As a result, little attention 
has been paid in the analyses of social optimality to the state where all of the optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied.  
 This paper first shows that, in dynamic models with a heterogeneous population, there 
exists a state where all of the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied 
(i.e., “sustainable heterogeneity”), although this state is not guaranteed to be naturally and 
always achieved, and it is influenced by the behavior of the most advantaged household (see 
Harashima, 2010). Even though it is not naturally achievable, it can be always achieved with 
appropriate government intervention. The existence of this state is very important because, 
unlike the case with static and dynamic models with homogeneous populations, we can obtain 
additional meaningful and useful information about social optimality. Dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population have another advantage—they describe the nature of economy far 
more realistically than static and dynamic models with homogeneous populations. Because little 
attention has been given to sustainable heterogeneity in analyses of social optimality, 
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discoveries derived from such analyses add a new analytical tool and may help solve the 
previously discussed problem of the unspecifiability of social optimality. 
 A distinct feature of the model presented in this paper is that a common nature of 
utility across the population is assumed to exist as a result of human evolution. Although utility 
functions are different across a population, some common features have been assumed, for 
example, a diminishing marginal rate of substitution. In this paper, an additional common nature 
is assumed such that extreme disutility is generated if all of the optimality conditions are not 
satisfied. The reason for this assumption, as described in more detail in Section 4, is that only 
humans who have this nature could have survived the process of natural selection. This 
additional common nature of utility plays an important role in the analyses of social optimality 
presented in this paper. 
 The model shows that sustainable heterogeneity is the unique socially optimal 
allocation for almost all generally usable (i.e., preferences are complete, transitive, and 
continuous) social welfare functions. This result is very important because the socially optimal 
allocation is uniquely determined without having to specify the shape of the social welfare 
function. This result therefore implies that, with the additional information provided by 
sustainable heterogeneity in dynamic models with a heterogeneous population, the problem of 
unspecifiability of social optimality can be solved.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a multi-economy endogenous growth 
model with heterogeneous population is constructed, and sustainability of heterogeneity is 
examined by using it. The existence of a unique balanced growth path on which all optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied is shown. Section 3 shows that 
sustainable heterogeneity is always achievable with appropriate government intervention even if 
the most advantaged household behaves unilaterally. In Section 4, extreme disutility to 
unsustainable heterogeneity is examined based on the gene theory of evolution. Section 5 
introduces a utility possibility frontier and social welfare function modified to dynamic models 
and shows that sustainable heterogeneity represents the unique socially optimal allocation. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 6. 
 
2  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY 
 
2.1  The model 
2.1.1  The base model 
In this paper, sustainability of heterogeneity is examined in the framework of endogenous 
growth, but most endogenous growth models commonly have problems with scale effects or the 
influence of population growth (e.g., Jones, 1995a, b). Hence, this paper uses the model 
presented by Harashima (2004), which is free from both problems (see also Jones, 1995a; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Peretto and Smulders, 2002). The production function is tY  
 ttt LKAF ,, , and the accumulation of capital is 
 
tttt AνCYK
   ,                            (1) 
 
where Yt is outputs, At is technology, Kt is capital inputs, Lt is labor inputs, Ct is consumption, 
 0ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 
ν
1
 of a unit of At are equivalent: that is, they are 
produced using the same quantities of inputs. All firms are identical and have the same size, and 
for any period, 
 
 3 
t
t
L
M
m   ,                               (2) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms, and  0m  is a constant. In addition,  
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thus,  
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is always kept, where yt is output per capita, kt is capital per capita, and  1  is a constant. 
For simplicity, the period of patent is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital depreciation is 
assumed.   indicates the effect of patent protection. With patents, the income is distributed to 
not only capitals and labors but technologies. Equation (2) indicates that population and number 
of firms are positively correlated. Equations (3) and (4) indicate that returns on investing in Kt 
and in At are kept equal and that a firm that produces a new technology cannot obtain all the 
returns on an investment in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt, but the investing 
firm’s return on the investment in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that 
   t
t
tt
t
t νA
Y
mLνA
Y
M 



 
 because of uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms and 
complementarity of technologies. 
 A part of the knowledge generated as a result of an investment made by a firm spills 
over to other firms. Researchers in firms as well as universities and research institutions could 
not effectively generate innovations if they were isolated from other researchers. They contact 
and stimulate each other. Probably, mutual partial knowledge spillovers among researchers and 
firms give each other reciprocal benefits. Researchers take hints on their researches in exchange 
for spilled knowledge. Therefore, even though the investing firm wishes to keep its knowledge 
secret, some parts of it will spill over. In addition, many uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
occur because many technologies are regarded as so minor that they are not applied for patents 
and left unprotected by patents. Nevertheless, even if a technology that was generated as a 
byproduct is completely useless for the investing firm, it may be a treasure for firms in a 
different industry. At includes all these technologies, and an investment in technology generates 
many technologies that the investing firm cannot protect by patents.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Marshall-Arrow-Romer [MAR] externalities; Marshall, 
1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Jacobs 
externalities; Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory assumes that knowledge spillovers between 
homogenous firms work out most effectively and that spillovers will therefore primarily emerge 
within one sector. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the 
number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that 
knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice different activities and that 
diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated 
knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors in the economy is larger. 
Nevertheless, if all sectors have the same number of firms, an increase in the number of firms in 
the economy results in more active knowledge spillovers in any case, owing to either MAR 
externalities or Jacobs externalities. 
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 Furthermore, as the volume of uncompensated knowledge spillovers increases, the 
investing firm’s returns on the investment in At decrease. 
t
t
A
Y


 indicates the total increase in Yt 
in the economy by an increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs in the firm that 
invested in the new technologies and outputs in other firms that utilize the newly invented 
technologies, whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm 
or by using uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers occur more actively, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y


 
that the investing firm can obtain becomes smaller, and the investing firm’s returns on the 
investment in At also become smaller. 
 Complementarity of technologies also reduces the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing 
firm can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with some particular 
technologies, the return on the investment in technology will belong not only to the investing 
firm but to the firms that hold these particular technologies. For example, an innovation in 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that hold complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y


 leaks to these firms. For 
them, the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue unexpectedly become obtainable thanks to the 
innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. In addition, as the 
number of firms increases, the number of firms that holds complementary technologies will also 
increase, and thereby these leaks will also increase.  
 Because of the uncompensated knowledge spillovers and the complementarity of 
technologies, therefore, the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that an investing firm can obtain on average will 
be comparatively small, i.e.,   will be far smaller than Mt except that Mt is very small,
1
 and 
the fraction will decrease as Mt increases.  
 The production function is specified as  tt
α
tt ,LKfAY   where α  10  α  is a 
constant. Let 
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t
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homogenous of degree one. Thus  t
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t
t
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
 . By equation (4), 
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

 1 . 
 
2.1.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
                                                          
1 If Mt is very small, the value of   will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt, because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation cannot be fully 
realized in the economy. This constraint can be modeled as   tM1~11~     where  1~   is a constant. 
Nevertheless, for sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such 
that      

~~11~lim 1
t
t
M
M
. 
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Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are 
examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions of the model shown in 
Section 2.1.1. First, suppose that there are two economies― economy 1 and economy 2—that 
are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The population growth 
rate is zero (i.e., 0tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 
2.1.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time preference is 
constructed.
2
 The rate of time preference of the representative household in economy 1 is 
1θ  
and that in economy 2 is θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The production function in economy 1 is 
 tαtt kfAy ,1,1   and that in economy 2 is  tαtt kfAy ,2,2  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, 
output and capital per capita in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2. The population of each 
economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and 
that in economy 2 is - τt. Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral technological 
progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
 α
ti,
α
ti,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,,   iLAKY
α
tt
α
titi
. 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration such that  
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Equation (5) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that 
 
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. Therefore, 
 
                                                          
2 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous time preference was originally shown by Harashima 
(2009b). 
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Because equation (5) is always held through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1   and tt yy ,2,1    are also held. Hence, 
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In addition, because 
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 through arbitration, then tt AA ,2,1
   is 
held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since 
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income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
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is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
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is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in 
activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt and it is assumed that gt depends on capitals such that  
 
,tt kgg 1  
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
 
,t,tt kgkgg 21   . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
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and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
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where ui,t, ci,t, and tiA ,
 , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and 
ttt AAA ,2,1
  . Equations (6) and (7) implicitly assume that each economy 
does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because 
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Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
vanishes and thereby 
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 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
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







 
   . 
 
Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
 
    dttθcuEMax ,t 2
0
22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
 
     ,t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t kgcτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 22
0
1
22 11 











 
   . 
 
2.1.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same as that of 
heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in regard to risk 
aversion.
3
 The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
1
11
1   and that of 
economy 2 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
2
22
2  , which are constant, and 21 εε  . The optimization problem of 
economy 1 is 
 
                                                          
3 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous risk aversion was originally shown by Harashima 
(2009c). 
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    dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
11
 , 
 
subject to 
 
     ,t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t kgcτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 11
0
1
11 11 











 
   , 
 
and that of economy 2 is 
 
    dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
22
 , 
 
subject to 
 
     ,t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α
,t kgcτdsτα
mν
α
kα
mν
α
k 22
0
1
22 11 











 
   . 
 
2.1.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not the utility 
function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a heterogeneous production 
function requires heterogeneity in elements other than technology. Prescott (1998) argues that 
unknown factors other than technology have made total factor productivity (TFP) heterogeneous 
across countries. Harashima (2009a) argues that average workers’ innovative activities are an 
essential element of productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, firms, and 
economies. Since average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual activities, they 
can create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms to exploit all 
the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. Furthermore, 
innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient production. A production 
function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been shown to have a Cobb-Douglas 
functional form with a labor share of about 70% (Harashima 2009a), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY
 1  ,                         (8) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ creative 
activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with 
regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are dependent on the 
creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with technology At, these parameters can 
be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In addition, only 
productivity that is represented by α
tLA Aωωσ  in equation (8) is heterogeneous between the 
two economies. The production function of economy 1 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 111   and that of 
economy 2 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 222  , where  10 11 ωω  and  10 22 ωω  are constants and 
12 ωω  . Since 
 
 
 
 
 
t
,t,t
t
t
t
,t,t
tt
,t,t
t
ti,
ti,
ti,
ti,
A
yy
mL
L
νA
yy
mLνA
YY
M
k
y
K
Y













  2121211
22

  by 
equation (5), then 
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    
 
    
 ,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
t
kfωmν
kfωkfωα
kfωmν
kfωkfωα
A
22
2211
11
2211
22 






 .         (9) 
 
Because equation (5) is always held through arbitration, equations 
tt k
ω
ω
k ,2
2
1
,1  , tt k
ω
ω
k ,2
2
1
,1
  , 
tt y
ω
ω
y ,2
2
1
,1  , and tt y
ω
ω
y ,2
2
1
,1
   are also held. In addition, since 
   
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21





  
by arbitration, 
tt A
ω
ω
A ,2
2
1
,1
   is held. Because of equation (9) and α
ti,
α
i kωf
 1 , then tA  
 
 
 
 222111
2
1
21211
1 1212
kωkkω
ωαmν
α
kkωkω
ωαmν
α αααα
α
αααα
α




  , 
α
αααα
α
αααα
ω
kωkkω
ω
kkωkω
2
222
1
11
1
1
21211 
 
, 
and         ααααααα
α
αααααα
α
ti
ti
kkωkkωα
mν
α
kkkωkωα
mν
α
k
y
 














2222
1
11
1
1
1
21211
1
,
,
1
2
1
2
 
. Since 
tt kk
ω
ω
,2,1
1
2  , then  2111
1
1
1
1
1
2
1211
1
1
21211 1 ωωk
ω
k
ω
ω
kωkω
ω
kkωkω
α
α
α
ααα
α
αααα














 and 
   121221111
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
21
1
21
11
2
222
1
11 11 











ωωkωωkk
ω
ω
k
ω
k
ω
ω
ωk
ω
ω
kω
ω
kωkkω
α
αα
α
αα
α
αααα
. Hence, 
 
 
 
 
 
 αmν
ωωα
k
αmν
ωωα
kAt







12
1
12
1 121
2
2
1
1
1

 , 
 
and 
 
  α
αα
ti,
ti,
α
mν
αωω
k
y 











 


 121 1
2

 
 
for i = 1, 2. Because 
t
α
t A
ω
ω
A ,2
1
1
2
,1








  (i.e.,   t,t,t,t AωωAAA 121121 1   ) and 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1





, then   
 
1
11
0
1
1
11
2










 
t
,tt,tt
t
s
,t
,t
,t,t
L
Aνgcτdsτ
k
y
yk   
    
1
1
2
1
11
0
1
1
1
2
1











 
t
tt,tt
t
s
,t
,t
,t
L
ωωAνgcτdsτ
k
y
y   
 
 
 
 
  ,tt
t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α k
αmL
α
gcτdsτα
mν
αωω
k
αmv
αωω
ω 11
0
121
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
212
1 






 








 

 
 , 
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and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 













 










 

ttt
t
s
α
α
t
α
t
t
t gcτdsτα
mν
αωω
k
αmv
αωω
ααmL
αmL
k ,1
0
121
,1
21
,1 1
2121
1 

  . 
 
 Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt and thus 
 
 
1
1
1



ααmL
αmL
t
t

, the optimization problem of economy 1 is 
 
    dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
11
 , 
 
subject to 
 
 
 
 
  ttt
t
s
α
α
t
α
t gcτdsτα
mν
αωω
k
αmv
αωω
k 




 








 

,1
0
121
,1
21
,1 1
212
  , 
 
and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
 
    dtθtcuEMax ,t 

exp
0
22
 , 
 
subject to 
 
 
 
 
 
  t,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
,t gcτdsτα
mν
αωω
k
αmv
αωω
k 




 








 

2
0
121
2
21
2 1
212
  . 
 
2.2  The multilateral path 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. Although the previously discussed state of 
Becker (1980) is Pareto efficient, by this definition, the heterogeneity is not sustainable because 
only the most patient household can achieve optimality. Sustainability is therefore the stricter 
criterion for welfare than Pareto efficiency. 
 In this section, the growth path that makes heterogeneity sustainable is examined. First, 
the basic natures of the models presented in Section 2.1 when the government does not 
intervene, i.e., 0g  are examined.  
 
2.1.1  The consumption growth rate 
2.2.3  Sustainability 
Because balanced growth is the focal point for the growth path analysis, the following analyses 
focus on the steady state such that 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim


, 
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim


, 
t
t
t k
k
,1
,1
lim


, 
t
t
t k
k
,2
,2
lim


, and 
t
t
t 


lim  are 
constants. 
 
2.2.3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
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The balanced growth path in the heterogeneous time preference model has the following 
properties. 
 
Lemma 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

 constant, 
then 
 
 

 




 t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
0
0
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlimlimlimlimlim



   . 
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Proposition 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim


 


t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
 
 The path on which 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

constant has the following properties. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Corollary 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 

t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim

 


t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, then 
 


t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c 
limlimlimlimlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 constant. 
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is 
 
 







 








 2
1limlim 211
2
2
1
1 θθα
mν
α
ε
c
c
c
c α
α
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t

 .
4
              (10) 
 
Corollary 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 

t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim

 


t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, 
                                                          
4 See Harashima (2010) 
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t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt
s
t
s
t
t
t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlimlimlimlim





 
            

t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t A
A
y
y
y
y 
limlimlim
,2
,2
,1
,1 constant.                          
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Because current account imbalances eventually grow at the same rate as output, consumption, 
and capital on the multilateral path, the ratios of the current account balance to output, 
consumption, and capital do not explode, but they stabilize as shown in the proof of Proposition 
1-1; that is, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t


,2,1
limlim . 
 On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1, 
heterogeneity in time preference is sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. The balanced growth path satisfying 
Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1 is called the “multilateral balanced growth path” or 
(more briefly) the “multilateral path” in the following discussion. The term “multilateral” is 
used even though there are only two economies, because the two-economy models shown can 
easily be extended to the multi-economy models shown in Section 2.2.6.  
 Because technology will not decrease persistently (i.e., 0lim 

t
t
t A
A
), only the case 
such that 0lim 

t
t
t A
A
 (i.e., 0limlim
,2
,2
,1
,1


t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c 
 on the multilateral path by Corollary 1-1) 
is examined in the following discussion. 
 
2.2.3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
On the multilateral path in the heterogeneous risk aversion model, the same Proposition, 
Lemmas, and Corollaries are proved by arguments similar to those shown in Section 2.2.3.1. 
 
Lemma 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

 constant, 
 
 

 




 t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
0
0
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,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlimlimlimlimlim



  . 
 
 
Proposition 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if 

t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim

 

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t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
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Corollary 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if 

t
t
t c
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,1
,1lim
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
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t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim

constant, 
 


t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
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1 constant. 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is  
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2
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1   . 5             (11) 
 
Corollary 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if 

t
t
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c
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lim
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
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
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
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

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           
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t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t A
A
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y
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limlimlim
,2
,2
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,1 constant. 
 
On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-2 and Corollaries 1-2 and 2-2, 
heterogeneity in risk aversion is also sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied, and this path is the multilateral path. 
 
2.2.3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Similar Proposition, Lemmas, and Corollaries also hold in the heterogeneous productivity 
model. However, unlike heterogeneous preferences, 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
 are 
possible even if 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim


  as equations (24) and (25) indicate. Therefore, the case of 
0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
 will be dealt with separately from the case of 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 
0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
 if necessary. 
 
Lemma 2-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, 
                                                          
5 See Harashima (2010) 
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then if 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

constant, 
 
 
t
t
t
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t
t
t
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k
k
k
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  , 
 
and if 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, then if 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
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
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t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
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,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlimlimlim


  
 
and  
 
     α
α
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
α
mν
αωω
ds
dt
dsd

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

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 By Lemma 2-3, if all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, either  
 
0limlim
,1
0
,1



t
t
s
t
t
t
t k
ds
k
τ 
                       (12) 
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α
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
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Proposition 1-3: If and only if 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

constant, all the optimality conditions of 
both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
 
Corollary 1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if 

t
t
t c
c
,1
,1
lim

 


t
t
t c
c
,2
,2
lim

constant, 
 


t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c 
limlimlimlimlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 constant. 
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Corollary 2-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, 
then if and only if 

t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim

constant, 
 

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and  
 
     α
α
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
α
mν
αωω
ds
dt
dsd

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

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On the two balanced growth paths satisfying Proposition 1-3 and Corollaries 1-3 and 2-3, 
heterogeneity in productivity is sustainable by definition because all the optimality conditions of 
the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
 By equations (24) and (25), the limit of the growth rate on these sustainable paths is 
 
 
 
  















 
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θ
αmv
αωω
ε
c
c
c
c
α
t
t
t
t
t
t 12
limlim 211
,2
,2
,1
,1   . 
 
 
2.2.4  The balance of payments 
2.2.4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1-1, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t


,2,1
limlim  and 
t
t
s
t k
ds
,1
0
lim



 
1
,1
,1
,2
0
limlim

 









t
t
t
t
t
s
t c
c
Ξ
k
ds 
 on the multilateral path. Because ki,t is positive, if the sign of Ξ 
is negative, the current account of economy 1 will eventually show permanent deficits and vice 
versa. 
 
Lemma 3-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 
 
    
1
1
21121 1
2
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2



















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
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
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
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
θθ
α
mν
α
α
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α
ε
θθ
Ξ
α
α
α
α

 . 
 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Lemma 3-1 indicates that the value of Ξ is uniquely determined on the multilateral path, and the 
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sign of Ξ is also therefore uniquely determined. 
 
Proposition 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0Ξ  if 
    
2
111 21
θθ
εαα
mν
α α
α






  . 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Proposition 2-1 indicates that the current account deficit of economy 1 and the current account 
surplus of economy 2 continue indefinitely on the multilateral path. The condition 
    
2
111 21
θθ
εαα
mν
α α
α






   is generally satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 Conversely, the opposite is true for the trade balance. 
 
Corollary 3-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0lim
0
,2
,2











  dsτk
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t
t
 if 
    
2
111 21
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εαα
mν
α α
α






  . 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Corollary 3-1 indicates that, on the multilateral path, the trade surpluses of economy 1 continue 
indefinitely and vice versa. That is, goods and services are transferred from economy 1 to 
economy 2 in each period indefinitely in exchange for the returns on the accumulated current 
account deficits (i.e., debts) of economy 1. 
 Nevertheless, the trade balance of economy 1 is not a surplus from the beginning. 
Before Corollary 3-1 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
s0  should be accumulated. In the early periods, 
when dsτ
t
s0  is small, the balance on goods and services of economy 1 ( dsτk
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 


0
,2
,2 ) 
continues to be a deficit. After a sufficient negative amount of dsτ
t
s0  is accumulated, the trade 
balances of economy 1 shift to surpluses. 
 Current account deficit of economy 1 means for example that a firm that is owned by 
economy 1 borrows money from a bank in which economy 2 deposits money. Economy 1 
indirectly borrows money from economy 2. This situation can be easily understood if you see 
the current account deficit of the United States.   
 
2.2.4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
Similarly, the value of Ξ in the heterogeneous risk aversion model is uniquely determined on the 
multilateral path. 
 
Lemma 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 
 
 
   
     




























 


























11
2
1
1
1
211
21
21
θα
mν
αεε
α
mν
α
εε
θα
mν
α
εε
Ξ
α
α
α
α
α
α


 . 
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Proposition 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0Ξ  if 
 
2
11 21
1 εε
α
mν
α
θ
α
α











. 
 
The condition  
2
11 21
1 εε
α
mν
α
θ
α
α











 is generally satisfied for reasonable 
parameter values.  
 
Corollary 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0lim
0
,2
,2











  dsτk
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t
t
. 
 
 By Lemma 3-2 and equations (21) and (22), the limit of the growth rate on the 
multilateral path is  
 
  













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
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 
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c
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c α
α
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t
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t
1
2
limlim
1
21
2
2
1
1   . 
 
 
2.2.4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
As Lemma 2-3 shows, on the multilateral path, either 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
 or 
 
  α
α
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
α
mν
αωω
ds
dt
dsd







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
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


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
121
0
0
1
2
limlim




 . On the former path, 0Ξ  and 
heterogeneous productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances. However, on the 
latter path, trade imbalances usually grow at a higher rate than consumption, because usually 
 
 
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
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
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
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
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t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
limlim


 ; thus, Ξ explodes to infinity. Hence, the latter path will generally not be 
selected. The question of which path is selected is examined in detail in the Section 2.3.3. 
 
2.2.5  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
The three heterogeneities are not exclusive. It is particularly likely that heterogeneities in time 
preference and productivity coexist. Many empirical studies conclude that the rate of time 
preference is negatively correlated with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 
2003); this indicates that the economy with the higher productivity has a lower rate of time 
preference and vice versa. In this section, the models are extended to include heterogeneity in 
multiple elements. 
 Suppose that economies 1 and 2 are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, 
and productivity. The Hamiltonian for economy 1 is 
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and that for economy 2 is 
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The growth rates are 
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and the limit of the growth rate on the multilateral path is 
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 as shown in Sections 
2.2.3 and 2.2.4. 
 The sign of Ξ on the multilateral path depends on the relative values between θ1 and θ2, 
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ε1 and ε2, and ω1 and ω2. Nevertheless, if the rate of time preference and productivity are 
negatively correlated, as argued above (i.e., if 
21 θθ   and 21 ωω   while 21 εε  ), then by 
similar proofs as those presented for Proposition 2-1 and Corollary 3-1, if 
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on the multilateral path; that is, the current account deficits and trade surpluses of economy 1 
continue indefinitely. The condition 
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satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 
2.2.6  Multi-economy models 
The two-economy models can be extended to include numerous economies that have differing 
degrees of heterogeneity.  
 
2.2.6.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Suppose that there are H economies that are identical except for time preference. Let θi be the 
rate of time preference of economy i and tjiτ ,,  be the current account balance of economy i 
with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, and i ≠ j. Because the total population is 
Lt, the population in each economy is 
H
Lt . The representative household of economy i 
maximizes its expected utility  
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for i ≠ j. 
 
Proposition 3-1: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and  
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
2.2.6.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The heterogeneous risk aversion model can be extended to the multi-economy model by a proof 
similar to that for Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for risk 
aversion, and their degrees of risk aversion are εi (i = 1, 2, … , H). 
 
Proposition 3-2: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
2.2.6.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
The heterogeneous productivity model can also be extended by a proof similar to that for 
Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for productivity, and their 
productivities are ωi (i = 1, 2, … , H). Note that, because 
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Proposition 3-3: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if 
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
2.2.6.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
Similarly, the multi-economy model can be extended to heterogeneity in multiple elements, as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 3-4: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneity in multiple elements, if and only 
if  
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for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied at steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
 Proposition 3-4 implies that the concept of the representative household in a 
heterogeneous population implicitly assumes that all households are on the multilateral path. 
 
2.3  The unilateral path 
The multilateral path satisfies all the optimality conditions, but that does not mean that the two 
economies naturally select the multilateral path. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that, 
under appropriate assumptions, the results of Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth 
models. Farmer and Lahiri (2005) show that balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a 
multi-agent economy in general, except in the special case that all agents have the same constant 
rate of time preference. How the economies behave in the environments described in Sections 2 
and 3 when the government does not intervene, i.e., 0g . is examined in this section. 
 
2.3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
The multilateral path is not the only path on which all the optimality conditions of economy 1 
are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve optimality, but economy 2 
cannot. 
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Lemma 4-1: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to satisfy all the 
optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
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at steady state, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
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economy 2 must initially set consumption such that 02,c , which violates the optimality 
condition of economy 2. Therefore, unlike with the multilateral path, all the optimality 
conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied on the path satisfying equation (19) even though 
those of economy 1 can. Hence, economy 2 has only one path on which all its optimality 
conditions can be satisfied—the multilateral path. The path satisfying equation (19) is called the 
“unilateral balanced growth path” or the “unilateral path” in the following discussion. Clearly, 
heterogeneity in time preference is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? Possibly, 
both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements may be reached. If 
no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards economy 2’s optimality 
conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not regard the 
optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
The reasoning behind Remark 1-1 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral path and 
sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The first option is for 
economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding economy 1: that is, to select its 
own unilateral path. The second option is to adapt to the behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If 
economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma 4-1 
indicates, unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two economies and 
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economy 2. As a result, 
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capital soon becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in 
that economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This process 
escalates as time passes because 
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 , and eventually 
almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are consumed by households in 
economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set c2,0 = ∞ to satisfy all its optimality 
conditions, as the proof of Lemma 4-1 indicates. Setting c2,0 = ∞ is impossible, but economy 2 
as the follower will initially set c2,t as large as possible. This action gives economy 2 a higher 
expected utility than that of the first option, because consumption in economy 2 in the second 
case is always higher. As a result, economy 2 imports as many goods and services as possible 
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accumulated debts of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. Furthermore, they will 
increase more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
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expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes extremely vulnerable to 
even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, economy 2 will lose all its 
capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This result corresponds to the state shown 
by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable for economy 2. Because 
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, inequality (27) holds, and the transversality condition for 
economy 1 is satisfied by Lemma 1-1. Thus, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are 
satisfied if economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in any case 
if economy 1 takes the unilateral path. Both options to counter the unilateral behavior of 
economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of economy 2 is 
higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 will choose the second 
option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the debts owed 
by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
2.3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The same consequences are observed in this model. 
 
Lemma 4-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if each economy sets τt without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, then all the optimality conditions of both 
economies cannot be satisfied. 
 
Therefore, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 
Remark 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
2.3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Unlike the heterogeneous preferences shown in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, heterogeneity in 
productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 
Lemma 4-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even if each economy sets τt without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, it is possible that all the optimality 
conditions of both economies are satisfied if 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
 All the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either equation (12) 
or (13) holds, because 
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 can be constant only when equation (12) or (13) holds. 
Equation (12) corresponds to the multilateral path, and equation (13) corresponds to the 
unilateral path. Unlike the heterogeneity in preferences, Lemma 4-3 shows that, even on the 
unilateral path, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied because the limit of 
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,1  . Therefore, heterogeneity in productivity is 
sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 Nevertheless, on the unilateral path, current account imbalances generally grow 
steadily at a higher rate than consumption; this is not the case on the multilateral path. How does 
economy 1 set τ? If economy 1 imports as many goods and services as possible before reaching 
the steady state at which 
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), the expected utility of economy 1 will be 
higher than it is in either case where τt > 0 or in the multilateral path. However, the debts 
economy 1 owes to economy 2 will grow indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption, and the 
ratio of debt to consumption explodes to infinity. If there is no disturbance, this situation will be 
sustained forever, but economy 1 will become extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative 
disturbance. Hence, the unilateral path will not necessarily be favorable for economy 1 although 
all its optimality conditions are satisfied on this path, and economy 1 will prefer the multilateral 
path. 
 
Remark 1-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even though economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the multilateral balanced growth path will be selected. 
 
Hence, the state shown by Becker (1980) will not be observed in the case of heterogeneous 
productivity.  
 
2.3.4  Doom of the less advantaged economies 
Remarks 1-1 and 1-2 indicate that economy 2’s ratio of debt to consumption continues to 
increase indefinitely on the unilateral path. Such an indefinitely increasing ratio may not matter 
if there is no shock or disturbance. However, if even a very tribunal negative shock occurs, 
economy 2 will be ruined because the huge amount of accumulated debts cannot be refinanced. 
In this case, “ruin” means that economy 2 will go bankrupt or be exterminated because its 
consumption has to be zero unless the authority intervenes to some extent (e.g., debt relief after 
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personal bankruptcy). Even if economy 2 continues to exist by the mercy of economy 1, it will 
fall into a slave-like state indefinitely without the authority’s intervention.  
 
3  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY WITH 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
 
Sustainable heterogeneity, as described in this paper, is a very different state from what Becker 
(1980) described. The difference emerges because, on a multilateral path, economy 1 behaves 
fully considering economy 2’s situation. The multilateral path therefore will not be naturally 
selected by economy 1, and the path selection may have to be decided politically (Harashima, 
2010). On the other hand, when economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the government may intervene 
in economic activities so as to achieve, for example, social justice.  
 In this section, I show that even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, sustainable 
heterogeneity can always be achieved with appropriate government intervention.   
 
3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Government intervention was first considered in the two-economy model constructed in Section 
2. If the government intervenes (i.e., 0g ),  
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on the path satisfying equation (19). At the same time, 
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Therefore, if  
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Equation (20) is identical to equation (10). The government’s appropriate redistribution from 
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economy 1 to economy 2 by g  leads to the same consequence with a multilateral path. 
 Note that if 
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3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
Similarly, all of the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either equation 
(18) or (19) is satisfied, and if  
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Equation (21) is identical to equation (11). Similar to the case with a heterogeneous time 
preference, the government’s appropriate redistribution by  
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leads to the same consequence with a multilateral path. 
 
3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Heterogeneity in productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. Hence, government 
intervention is not necessary; that is, even if 0g , the unilateral path is sustainable. 
 
3.4  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
By similar procedures as those used in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, if  
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and equation (22) is identical to equation (14). 
 
3.5  Multi-economy models 
3.5.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 29 
If H = 2, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined 
economy (economy 1+2) with twice the population and a rate of time preference of 
2
21 θθ  . 
Suppose there is a third economy with a time preference of θ3. Because economy 1+2 has twice 
the population of economy 3, if 
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By iterating similar procedures, if the government’s transfers between economy H and economy 
1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (23) is the same as equation (15).  
 
3.5.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
By a similar procedure as that used for heterogeneous time preference, if the sum of the 
government transfers between economy H and economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
 
  






















θα
mν
α
ε
H
ε
ε
g
α
α
H
q
q
H
q
q
H
11
1
1
1

 , 
 
then 
 
 30 
 
































θα
mν
α
H
ε
c
c α
α
H
q
q
ti,
ti,
t
1lim
1
1                   (24) 
 
for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (24) is the same as equation (16).  
3.5.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
As discussed in Section 3.3, even if government transfers between economy H and economy 
1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is nil (i.e., 0g ), the unilateral path is sustainable. 
 
3.5.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
By combining the procedures and results presented in Section 3.4, 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, it can be 
shown that, if the sum of government transfers between economy H and economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + 
(H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (26) is the same as equation (17).  
 
3.6  Models of partially unilateral behaviors 
Here, suppose that economy 1 undertakes partly unilateral and partly multilateral behaviors such 
that ψ of k1,0 is allocated to the unilateral path and (1 − ψ) of k1,0 is allocated to the multilateral 
path, where 0 < ψ < 1. In this case, if an appropriate value of g  is set, both the unilateral and 
multilateral parts of k1,t achieve sustainable heterogeneity because the unilateral part of k1,t is 
forced on a path of sustainable heterogeneity by appropriate government intervention, whereas 
the multilateral part of k1,t naturally takes a path of sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore, even 
though economy 1 behaves partly unilaterally and partly multilaterally, if an appropriate value 
of g  is set, the combined path can be sustainable. I call this a “sustainable partly unilateral 
path.” 
 Corresponding to different values of ψ, sustainable partly unilateral paths are different 
and will fall somewhere between the multilateral path and the fully unilateral path with 
appropriate government transfers described by equation (26). In addition, sustainable partly 
unilateral paths will move continuously as the value of ψ continuously moves. 
 Note that this paper assumes that government intervention can be represented only by 
g , but many other types of interventions are actually possible. For example, debt relief after 
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personal bankruptcy would work as a measure to achieve sustainable heterogeneity, but the 
paths of the less advantaged economies may not be continuous in that case. 
 
4  EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF UTILITY 
 
4.1  Genes and utility 
The gene-centered view of evolution indicates that evolution is the result of the differential 
survival of competing genes (see, e.g., Hamilton 1964a; b, Williams, 1966), and the gene is the 
unit of selection. Genes compete to survive, and only genes that “won” the competition have 
survived the evolutionary process by fully utilizing their phenotypic effects. The gene-centered 
view implies that species are governed by an extremely strong desire for the indefinite 
continuation of their genes. Although some mutations may have existed that made an individual 
lack such a desire, such mutations must eventually be exterminated through natural selection. A 
strong desire to survive as a phenotypic effect indicates that humans are extremely motivated to 
avoid of being exterminated.  
 Altruistic behaviors of individuals in a group that shares a common pool of genes may 
be observed, but the gene-centered view implies that the group as a whole will demonstrate an 
extremely strong desire to escape the possibility of being exterminated. Some individuals may 
even die to save the group, but the group will never willingly choose to be destroyed because 
the common pool of genes would be lost.  
 The concept of utility should be consistent with the theory of evolution, and the above 
arguments indicate that the prospect of being exterminated should produce extreme fear (i.e., 
extreme disutility) in human beings. As Becker (1980) showed, unless sustainable heterogeneity 
is achieved, less advantaged households will perish when even a very small negative shock 
occurs, so the possibility of extinction does occur in dynamic models with a heterogeneous 
population. The possibility of extinction should result in a situation of extreme disutility for 
households in an economy, and human beings are “programmed” to take extreme actions to try 
to escape this result, thereby enabling the common pool of genes to survive. The gene-centered 
view of evolution indicates that the extreme disutility experienced in this situation is a natural 
outcome of evolution.  
 
4.2  Extreme disutility to unsustainable heterogeneity 
Section 2.3 indicates that, on a unilateral path without government intervention, less advantaged 
economies are exterminated or, at best, fall into a slave-like state. The slave-like state can be 
seen as equivalent to being exterminated in the sense that the members of those economies are 
treated more like disposable materials. As discussed in Section 4.1, either extermination or 
living in a slave-like state should generate extreme fear and disutility in residents of these 
economies. Hence, the unilateral path without government intervention will generate extreme 
disutility in the less advantaged economies. 
 Note that households are assumed to live infinitely long in this paper; thus, 
extermination does not mean the death of an individual with a finite lifespan. It is the extinction 
of a dynasty, and in biological terms, indicates that all group members who share a common 
pool of genes perish.  
 It could be argued that being forced to live in a slave-like state does not generate 
extreme disutility because the common pool of genes is preserved. However, the members of 
these economies can be exterminated at will at any time by the most advantaged economy. 
Therefore, such states merely mean that extermination is postponed, and the expectations of 
either being exterminated or falling into in a slave-like state will equally generate extreme 
disutility.  
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4.3  The utility of being exterminated 
The utility function ui(ci,t) is modified to  
 
  i,ti,ti ,cσu  , 
 
where σi,t takes two values, 1 and 0. σi,t = 0 if economy i is exterminated, and σi,t = 1 if economy 
i is not exterminated (extermination includes falling in a slave-like state). The utility function 
allows negative values of utility. Being exterminated (i.e., σi,t = 0) generates extreme disutility 
such that 
   
  i,ti ,cu 0  
 
for any ci,t; that is, extreme disutility is expressed as infinite disutility. If economy i expects to 
be exterminated in some future period tʹ such that E (σi,t) = 0 for t > tʹ, then 
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for t > tʹ. If economy i does not expect to be exterminated in the future such that E (σi,t) = 1 for 
any t, then  
 
    i,tii,tti ,cEu,cσEu 1  . 
 
 Note that infinite disutility may indicate that utility is cardinal. Nevertheless, the 
infinite disutility of  i,ti ,cu 0 expressed here as   i,ti ,cu 0 can be defined by an ordinal 
expression such that  i,ti ,cu 0 is identical for any ci,t, and  
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for any ci,t [e.g.,    ,u,u ii 001  ], where    21 11 i,t,ii,t,i ,cu,cu   when 21 i,t,i,t, cc  . 
 
5  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY AS THE 
UNIQUE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL ALLOCATION 
 
5.1  The utility possibility frontier 
A modified utility possibility frontier is needed for analyses using dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population.  
 
5.1.1  The utility possibility frontier for an endogenous growth model 
Because the model used in this paper is a dynamic one, streams of utilities have to be compared. 
The utility possibility frontier, therefore, does not consist of period-utilities but of discounted 
sums of expected utilities. For simplicity, the two-economy model is again used where economy 
1 has a lower rate of time preference and a lower degree of risk aversion than economy 2. Let  
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be the utility possibility frontier of economies 1 and 2, where σi, t is σ of economy i (= 1, 2) in 
period t and  U~  is a two-dimensional function.  
 The summation of expected period-utilities indicates that period-utilities are cardinal 
over time in an economy. Nevertheless, the discounted sums of expected utilities derived from 
different future paths are not required to be cardinal. They merely express ordinal rankings; for 
example, a higher value of    



0
exp1
t
ii,ti dttθ,cuE simply means that economy i prefers the 
path that leads to the higher value over another path with a lower value, and 
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for any ci,t if E (σi,t) = 0 for t > tʹ (    

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, exp
t
ii,ttii dttθ,cσuE is expressed here as -∞ in this 
case). In addition, comparability of utilities among different economies is not required; that is, 
the utilities of economies 1 and 2 do need not to be comparable in this model. Note however 
that although an ordinal expression is possible, a cardinal expression is used for simplicity in the 
following examinations.  
 Let
ti,ψ,c be the consumption of economy i (= 1, 2) with fully appropriate government 
transfers corresponding to a given degree of unilateral behavior of economy 1 (ψ). The points on 
the utility possibility frontier that achieve sustainable heterogeneity are expressed by 
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5.1.2  The shape of the utility possibility frontier 
The analyses in Sections 2 and 3 indicate that the points on the utility possibility frontier that 
achieve sustainable heterogeneity consist only of the curve segment AB in Figure 1. Point A 
indicates the multilateral path, and point B indicates the fully unilateral path with appropriate 
government intervention. Because, as shown in Section 3.6, sustainable partly unilateral paths 
continuously move as the degree of unilateral behavior of economy 1 (ψ) continuously moves, 
curve segment AB is continuous. 
 Curve segment AB will slope downward to the right; that is, the discounted sum of 
expected utilities of economy 1 will decrease and that of economy 2 will increase as economy 1 
engages in more unilateral behavior (i.e., ψ becomes larger) and the scale of government 
intervention increases. The reason for this correlation is that part of economy 1’s accumulated 
capital is being consumed by economy 2. Therefore, future consumption of economy 1 is 
smaller than it would be without government intervention and that of economy 2 is larger. In 
addition, in the early periods of the consumption path, consumption in economy 1 on a 
unilateral path is smaller than that on the multilateral path because capital is accumulated more 
quickly on a unilateral path. Because the government’s intervention reduces accumulated capital 
and future utilities are discounted by the rate of time preference, these early smaller utilities will 
not be compensated fully by future increases in consumption that would result from the quicker 
capital accumulation. As a result, the discounted sums of expected utilities of economy 1 on 
sustainable partly unilateral paths will be smaller than that on the multilateral path and the curve 
segment will slope downward to the right. Whether the curve slopes downward or upward is not 
important for the results shown below, however. The results depend not on the direction but on 
the monotonicity of the curve segment, that is, the monotonous relationship between ψ and 
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
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exp1
t
it,i,ψi dttθc,uE . 
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 The government’s responses to the unilateral behaviors of economy 1, by which 
sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, are very limited—only responses corresponding to 
sustainable partly unilateral paths are chosen. Given a degree of unilateral behavior of economy 
1 (i.e., given a value of ψ), only one government response, which is indicated by equation (25), 
correspondingly can successfully achieve sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore only one point 
on curve segment AB consists of the utility possibility frontier for any given value of ψ.  
 For simplicity, the possibility of too much government intervention is not considered, 
and g never exceeds the value for sustainable heterogeneity. Hence, all other responses result in 
a disutility of −∞ for economy 2 because it expects to be exterminated in future such that  
 
  ,t,cEu 22 0  
 
after a finite period of time; thus, 
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The utility possibilities of such unsustainable heterogeneity for all values of ψ are depicted by 
the line CD in Figure 1. Given a value of ψ, a part of the line CD correspondingly consists of 
the utility possibility frontier of unsustainable heterogeneity. Let such part of the line CD be 
“the line C(ψ)D(ψ),” where point C(ψ) indicates the insufficient intervention that gives the 
smallest discounted sum of expected utility of economy 1 and point D(ψ) indicates the 
insufficient intervention that gives the largest. Each point on the line C(ψ)D(ψ) has a 
corresponding value of g , all of which are insufficient to achieve sustainable heterogeneity for 
the given ψ. 
 As a result, given a degree of unilateral behavior of economy 1 (i.e., given a value of 
ψ), the utility possibility frontier is composed of the two parts: a point on the curve segment AB 
and the line C(ψ)D(ψ).  
 
5.2  The social welfare function 
Here, a social welfare function is assumed to be adopted by the society consisting of the all 
economies. The assumptions in Arrow (1951) are modified (e.g., the assumption that every 
individual has a single-peaked preference is added). The social welfare function that is defined 
on the same space as the utility possibility frontier is  
 
         Wdttθ,cσuE,dttθ,cσuEW
t
,tt
t
,tt 


  



 0
22,22
0
11,11 expexp
~
 , 
 
where  W~ is a two-dimensional function and W is a variable. Its shape is not specified but it 
at least satisfies the following typical features: completeness, transitivity, and continuity. Thus, 
its indifference curves do not cross and are sloping downward to the right. The social welfare 
function’s indifference curves are either convex or concave to the origin. In addition, on any 
indifference curve, as ci,t → 0 for any t, ci,t → ∞ for any t (i ≠ j). I call this type of social welfare 
function a “general type social welfare function.” 
 Next, suppose a continuous function such that  
 
        0expexp~
0
22,22
0
11,11 


  



 t
,tt
t
,tt dttθ,cσuE,dttθ,cσuEV  
 
defined on the same space as the utility possibility frontier is. Points satisfying this function are 
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indicated by  21,vv , where 0
1
2 
dv
dv
and v2 = 0 when v1 = 0, as shown as the dotted line in 
Figure 2. The indifference curve that crosses the function   0~ V at point  21,vv  is  
 
          



  



 0
22,22
0
11,1121 expexp
~
,
~
t
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t
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 Suppose another type of social welfare function such that, for any point  21,vv , 
     



  

0
22,22121 exp
~
,
~
t
,tt dttθ,cσuE,vWvvW  for any     2
0
2222 exp vdttθ,cσuE
t
,t,t 


. That 
is, the indifference curves are vertical if     2
0
2222 exp vdttθ,cσuE
t
,t,t 


, as shown as the 
solid lines in Figure 2. I call this type of social welfare function a “Nietzsche type social welfare 
function.” This type of social welfare function is completely different from the general type 
social welfare function because it does not possess the nature that as ci,t → 0 for any t, ci,t → ∞ 
for any t (i ≠ j) on any indifference curve. The Nietzsche type social welfare function may be 
loathed by many people because it indicates that a society should not care about its members 
being exterminated and does not exclude the social preference that only the strongest should 
prevail. Although a few people may support the Nietzsche type social welfare function, the 
probability of violent political conflicts will become extremely high if a society adopts it (see 
Harashima, 2010).  
 
5.3  The almost unique socially optimal allocation 
The socially optimal state is given by the point where the utility possibility frontier and an 
indifference curve of the social welfare function come in contact with each other. As shown in 
Section 5.1, however, the utility possibility frontier’s shape is not simple. Given a degree of 
unilateral behavior of economy 1, it is composed of a point on the curve segment AB and the 
line C(ψ)D(ψ). 
 Given a value of ψ, let the corresponding point on the curve segment AB be indicated 
by (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ). Let also W(ς) be W of the indifference curve that crosses the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ), and 
(γ1,W(ς), γ2,W(ς)) indicate points on the indifference curve W(ς). In addition, let the point D(ψ) be 
indicated by (δ1, δ2), W(δ) be W of the indifference curve that crosses the point D(ψ), and (γ1,W(δ), 
γ2,W(δ)) indicate points on the indifference curve W(δ). As argued in Sections 4.3 and 5.1.1, δ2 is 
expressed as -∞. 
 Because of the nature of the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ), the following 
proposition is self-evident. 
 
Proposition 4: If the social welfare function is a general type and its indifference curves are 
convex to the origin, then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal.  
 
Because it is highly likely that social welfare functions in most societies are general type 
functions and their indifferent curves are convex to the origin, Proposition 4 indicates that 
generally the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is uniquely socially optimal. 
 I next examine social optimality when the social welfare function’s indifference 
curves are concave to the origin. 
 
Lemma 5: If the social welfare function is a general type and its indifference curves are 
concave to the origin, then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. 
Proof: Because the social welfare function is a general type and its indifference curves are 
concave to the origin, then γ1,W(ς) > ς1,ψ if γ2,W(ς) < ς2,ψ, and as γ1,W(ς) becomes larger, γ2,W(ς) 
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becomes smaller. Let γ2,W(ς), D be γ2,W(ς) when γ1,W(ς) = δ1. Because the social welfare function is 
not a Nietzsche type, then γ2,W(ς), D > δ2 = −∞. Therefore, W(ς) > W(δ). Because the values of W 
of the indifference curves that cross any other point on the line C(ψ)D(ψ) than the point D(ψ) 
are less than W(δ), then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal.                            ■ 
 
Lemma 5 shows that even though the social welfare function’s indifference curves are concave 
to the origin, the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is uniquely determined to be 
socially optimal if the social welfare function is a general type.  
 Next, I examine social optimality when the social welfare function is a Nietzsche type. 
Let (v1,W(ς), v2,W(ς)) be (v1, v2) on the indifference curve W(ς). When the social welfare function is 
Nietzsche type, then γ1,W(ς) ≤ v1,W(ς), where γ1,W(ς) < v1,W(ς) if γ2,W(ς) > v2,W(ς) and γ1,W(ς) = v1,W(ς) if 
γ2,W(ς)≤ v2,W(ς). 
 
Lemma 6: If the social welfare function is a Nietzsche type, and  
(a) if v1,W(ς) < δ1, then only the point (δ1, δ2) is optimal,  
(b) if v1,W(ς) > δ1, then only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal, and  
(c) if v1,W(ς) = δ1, then only the points (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) and (δ1, δ2) are optimal.  
Proof: Because the social welfare function is a Nietzsche type and thus its indifference curves 
are concave to the origin, then δ1 = γ1,W(δ) and if γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, then v1,W(ς) = γ1,W(ς). Hence, the 
following statements apply. 
(a) If v1,W(ς) < δ1, then γ1,W(ς) < γ1,W(δ) for γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, and thus W(ς) < W(δ). Because the 
values of W of the indifference curves that cross any other point on the line C(ψ)D(ψ) than the 
point D(ψ) are less than W(δ), then only the point (δ1, δ2) is optimal. 
(b) If v1,W(ς) > δ1, then γ1,W(ς) > γ1,W(δ) for γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, and thus W(ς) > W(δ). By the same 
reason as the latter part of (a), only the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. 
(c) If v1,W(ς) = δ1, then γ1,W(ς) = γ1,W(δ) for γ2,W(ς) = δ2 = −∞, and thus W(ς) = W(δ). Again, by the 
same reason as the latter part of (a), only points (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) and (δ1, δ2) are optimal.          ■ 
 
Lemma 6 indicates that Nietzsche type social welfare functions are distinguished into the 
following three categories. 
Category (i): only point (δ1, δ2) is socially optimal (corresponding to the case v1,W(ς) < δ1). 
Category (ii): only point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is only socially optimal (corresponding to the case v1,W(ς) > 
δ1).  
Category (iii): only points (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) and (δ1, δ2) are socially optimal (corresponding to the case 
v1,W(ς) = δ1). 
 
Proposition 5: If the social welfare function is either a general or Nietzsche type, the point (ς1,ψ, 
ς2,ψ) is only socially optimal allocation for any social welfare function except categories (i) and 
(iii) Nietzsche type social welfare functions, 
Proof: First, by Proposition 4, if the social welfare function is a general type and its indifferent 
curves are convex to the origin, the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. Second, by Lemma 5, if the 
social welfare function is a general type and its indifferent curves are concave to the origin, the 
point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal. Finally, by Lemma 6, if the social welfare function is a category (ii) 
Nietzsche type, the point (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is optimal, whereas if it is either a category (i) or (iii) 
Nietzsche type, the point (δ1, δ2) can be socially optimal.                              ■ 
 
 Proposition 5 is important because it indicates that, for almost all generally usable (i.e., 
preferences are complete, transitive, and continuous) social welfare functions, the point of 
sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is the only socially optimal allocation. In addition, it is 
highly likely that very few people actually support category (i) or (iii) Nietzsche type social 
welfare functions because they will generate violent political conflicts (see Harashima, 2010), 
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and they will almost certainly always be in the minority. Hence these types of welfare functions 
will be rarely adopted in democratic societies where policies are decided by majority.
6
 In other 
words, category (i) or (iii) Nietzsche type social welfare functions would only be adopted by a 
democratic society when its economic and social situations were extraordinary abnormal. If the 
situation is not extraordinarily abnormal, category (i) and (iii) Nietzsche type social welfare 
functions can be excluded, and we can assert that for any generally usable social welfare 
function, the point of sustainable heterogeneity (ς1,ψ, ς2,ψ) is uniquely socially optimal. 
 Proposition 5 provides a clue to solve an important problem in studies of social 
welfare, that is, the unspecifiability of socially optimal allocation resulting from the difficulty in 
specifying the shape of the social welfare function. Proposition 5 escapes this problem because 
the socially optimal allocation is uniquely determined no matter the shape of the social welfare 
function. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to form a specific social ordering to determine the 
socially optimal growth path in a heterogeneous population.  
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Historically, it has been difficult to universally agree upon a criterion for socially optimal 
allocation because of utility’s interpersonal incomparability, Arrow’s general possibility 
theorem, and other factors. This paper examined social optimality in dynamic models with a 
heterogeneous population and showed that a state exists in which all of the optimality conditions 
of a heterogeneous population are satisfied. The existence of such a state provides us with 
additional meaningful information for studying social optimality.  
 The model in this paper shows that sustainable heterogeneity, which is defined as the 
state at which all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied, is uniquely 
determined to be the socially optimal allocation for almost all generally usable social welfare 
functions. The only exceptions are some variants of a Nietzsche type social welfare function, 
which will rarely be adopted in democratic societies unless the economic and social situations 
are extraordinarily abnormal. Sustainable heterogeneity is achievable even if the most 
advantaged household behaves unilaterally if the government appropriately intervenes. The 
uniquely determined socially optimal allocation in a heterogeneous population can be 
accomplished without specifying the shape of the social welfare function, and therefore, the 
problem of unspecifiability of social optimality can be solved.  
 Sustainable heterogeneity as the unique socially optimal allocation will have important 
implications to currently passionately disputed issues such as the Occupy Wall Street movement, 
anti-globalization (e.g., Klein, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002), anti-market fundamentalism (e.g., Gray, 
1998; Stiglitz, 2002, 2009; Soros, 2008), and true measures of happiness (e.g., Sen, 1976; Arrow 
et al., 1995). In addition, sustainable heterogeneity will provide additional theoretical 
foundations for debt relief, wealth taxes, progressive taxation, and international aid. On the 
other hand, sustainable heterogeneity also indicates that there is a unique sustainable level of 
inequality in consumption. 
 
                                                          
6 As shown in Section 5.2, it is assumed that the assumptions in Arrow (1951) are modified. 
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Figure 1 The utility possibility frontiers of sustainable and unsustainable 
heterogeneity 
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Figure 2 Indifference curves of a Nietzsche type social welfare function 
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